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G ENDER E QUITI AND THE I NDIAN I NCOME T AX
- Maithreyi Mulupuru
The constant refrain in the mai nstream media regarding the "human face" of
government acts, especially budgets, reAects a growing preoccupation with
taxation as serving twin aims: the raising of revenue and the redistribution of
wealth. I While the raising of revenue is the obvious rask of any tax,
the redistributive function of taxation plays out in the way taxation law
regulates the competitive market, as well as in terms of the redistribution
that takes place due ro government spending.
The imposi tion of taxes has direct effects on savmgs and mvestment
behaviour of market players and, therefo re, on employment, production
and consumption .' It has long been accepted that these effects of
taxation on market behaviour should be exploited by a State in order
ro achieve poli cy ends.' This system of incentives and disincentives is put
in place through a complex structu re consis ting of varying rates of taxes,
exemptions from taxation and deductions in the computation of taxable
See, for example, M. Sharma and M. Banerjee, Mamata's 'Human Face' rail Budget
to be preJented today. NDTV, July
3,
2009 .
availabl e at http: //www.
ndty.com /n
li ndia/ rn am ata human f.1.C rail bud ct
rese nted wda . h
; "State Budget has a human face, says Union Minister", Tim es of India. availa Ie a l
hnp: ll timesofi ndia.indiatimes.com/c iry/rhirupuram/Starcbudgcthasahum anfacesays
ministerlarticleshow/40289233.cms. (aecessed on 24.04.2009).
2

Fo r recent empirical research on these lines, see W Easlerly & S. Rebelo, Filea'
Policy and Economic Growth: An Empirical Investigation 32(3) JOURNAL OF MONETARY
ECONOMICS, ELSEVIER 4 1745 8 (1993); K. Jinill & H.K. Sunghyu n. Welfore effietJ of
tax policy in open economies: stabilization and cooperation 51 FINANCE AND ECONOMICS
DISCUSSION SE RI ES (2003) Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.),
availabl e at http: // ideas.repec.o rg, (accessed on 05.09.2009).

3

An extremely interesting analysis of th e et hics of taxation may be fo und in R.W McGee,
Taxation and Public Finance: A Philosophical and Ethical Approach 1 COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAw Of ACCOUNTING & FINANCE 157240 (1997). Avail able at http://ssrn.com /
abs traCl -461340. (accessed on 05.09.2009).
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income, and efforts ro simplifY this struCture are constantly and ironically
carried on simultaneously with increased use of these devices . The effect that
taxatio n has on econom ic behaviour is used ro regulate the market, and in
some cases, ro ensure thatthe tax structute encourages equitable distribution
of resources. In addition , direct government spending also aims at achieving
economIC equity.
In traditional tax theory, equity has been one of the fo ur fun damental
canons of taxa tion ' Any tax, it is said, must be equitable both
horizontally' and vertically.6 Though this is primarily undersrood in terms
of economic facrors , understanding the inter-linkages between economic
and social equity inevitably leads ro the realization that taxation has ro
be eq uitable not only across income groups, but also has ro be equitable
across social groups such as gender and caste. Therefore, the obvious
requirement of an equitable income tax system, according to the principles of
equity, is that people with similar incomes be treated similarly and people
with different incomes be treated differently. However, when we facror in
the disadvantages faced by women because they do not earn an income
- lack of financial independence contributing to their disempowerment in
society - there appears the social goal of encouraging women ro engage
in formal market labour. Since taxes increase the costs of participating in
the market, reducing the tax burden on women appears ro be one way of
enco uraging the ir participation in the market. Thus, a rule exempting some
part of women's income from tax or allowing them an add itional deduction
may be considered necessary for equity.?
4

5

Equity. efficiency, simplicity and administrative efficiency arc considered the fo ur canons
o(raxarion in dassical economics.

Horiwmal equity requires that people with similar economic status be taxed similarly.
FORD HAM URB. L.). 607
(1996) .

Su M Kornhauser, Equality, Liberty and a Fair Income Tax 23
6

Vertical equiry requires that people be taxed in accordance with thei r economic Status or

'ability to pay.' Su ibid. For further discuss ion on the rationale of progressive taxation .
see l.A. Schoenblum, Tax Unfairness or Fairness? A Consideration oftlu Philosophical Baus
for Un<qual Taxation of Individuals 12AM.). TAX POl'y 221 (1995).

7

For instance, under the I NCOME TAX Acr as amended by the FINANCE Acr 2009, men's
income is exempr up w a limit ofRs. 1,60,000, while women's incom e is exempt up to
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A rule of this nature can also be understood as Rowing from the basic
constitutional principles that require state action ro be non-discriminatory
and promote affirmative action in favour of histOrically disadvantaged groups
of people'
In examining the equity-linked implications of fiscal policy, It has
generally been assumed that how the govern ment spends Its money has
a greater direct impact in addressing issues such as poverty and inequality
than how the government raises its funds. ' While budget analysis every year
does include comment on whether it contains incentives or disincentives
for specific classes of people, lo the comment hardly ever transforms into
an analysis of the redistributive effects of the fiscal policy embodied in the
budger. 11 However, the revenue side of the budget, and specifically taxation

Rs. 1,90,000. Thi s higher exemp tion limit results in a woman 's tax burden being less
than that of a man with the same income.

8

In India, this rule is articulated in Article 15 of the Constitution, which first prevents
disc rimination on the basis of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth, and goes on to

say "Nothing in this article shall prevent [he State from making any special provision for
women and children" and "Nothing in this anicle or in clause (2) of art. 29 shal l prevent
the State from making any special provision fo r the advancement of any socially and
educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Schedul ed Castes and the Scheduled
Tribes." An. I 5(4) allows the Slate to make spccialjrovisions for socially and educationally
backward classes of citizen , Scheduled Castes an Scheduled Tribes.

9

The concept of a 'gender budget,' introduced in India in 2005. refl ects this anirude.
Su the full text of the budget speech, 2005, at hnp:llindiabudget.nic.in, (accessed on

05.09.2009).
10

For instance, in relation to the Finance Act 2005, a series of commentators pointed out
th e 'incentives' to women in the form of the higher income exemption limit. Some of
these commentators also mentioned that the rebate under Section aac would no longe r
be available. However, the fact that the higher exemption limit would nOt compensate
for the loss of the rebate was not mentioned; the funher fact that the higher exempt ion
limit applied only to salaried women, while (he rebate was revoked across the board was
completely ignored. See, for instance, A. Shooyan. How Budget '05 afficts the common
man THE ECONOMIC TIMES , Mar 2 2005.

11

If such an anal ys is were to be applied to the points raised above, fOi instance, it
would be seen that professional and selfemployed women arc being treated on par with
their male counterparts, while salaried women arc not. This has obvious implications for
the neutral i ~ principle; further, me nowrevoked rebate in fact functioned as an offset for
the fact that expenses on childcare and household help have never been considered as
deductible. even if they were incurred 'wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business
or profession ,' as required by Section 37 of the I NCOME TAX Aer.
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policy, can also have direct redistributive effects, through impacts on disposable
income, which can either benefit or disadvantage certain sectors In socIety,
such as women. 12

It is in this light that this paper seeks to address the system of personal taxation
in India, examining it from the standpoint of gender equity. This paper does
nOt seek to conduct an exhaustive examination of the provisions in the Income
Tax Act; it seeks, rather, to examine selected provisions u der certain btoad
heads, as being representative of our fiscal policy. " In doing so, it relies upon
similar exercises that have been conducted in a number of" other countries,
where jurisprudence examining the gendered nature of taxation has been
developed over a period of time. " In examining the Income Tax to
identifY some of the gendered assumptions that underlie our fiscal policy and
the gendered effects of the current system of taxation, this paper first examines
the nature of what is sought to be taxed by the Income Tax by studying the
concept of income through a feminist lens. It then goes on to examine
the unit of personal taxation in India, before finally looking at what
the Income Tax does not tax, viz., the scope of tax-exempl income.
This paper, therefore, conducts a feminist analysis of taxation based on the
position that it is necessary for an analysis of gendered assumptions and
effects to inform scholarship in every field of law, iflaw is to strive for the
achievement of equity. It is in pursuit of this 'mainstreaming' of feminist

12

For detailed analysis . see A.L. Alsrott, Th~ Earned Income Tax Credit and the
Limitations ofTaxBosed Wellim Reform 108 HARV. L. REv. 533 (1995); For anal ysis of
the redistributive effects
taxation, see D. M. Byrne, Locke, Property and Progressive
Tax" 78 NEB. L. REv. 700 (\999); j . Bankman & T. Griffith, Social We/fo re and the
Rat< Structu,,: A New Look at Progrmive Taxation 75 CAL. L. RIv. 1905 (\ 987).

or

13

The Income Tax Act is proposed to be replaced by the Direct Taxes Code, currendy a
draft Bill. Where the Code makes a difference to lhe analysis in this paper, (he rel evam
draft provisions have been taken into account.

14

Su, for instance, D. Brown, The Marriage PmaltylBonus Debate: L 'gislative lsJU~s in Black
and Whit< 16 N.Y.L. SCH . j. H U M. RTS. 287 (1999); K.B. Brown, Not Colour or Gender
N~ulra/: NroJ Tax Tr~atmmt of Employmtnl Discrimination Dam(lg~s 7 S. CAL. REv. L.
'" WOMEN'S STUD. 223 (1997); A.C. Christian, Joint \bus Separdt< Filing:]oin t Return
Tax Rates and F~tkra/ Complicity in Dir~cting Economic R~sourus from Womm 10 Mm 6
S. CAL. REv. L. '" WOMEN'S STUD. 443 (1997) .
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analysis that the author has undertaken this exercise in the field of tax law
and policy.'5

WHAT DOES THE INCOME TAX TAX?
To many practitioners and students, this would appear to be a question that
answers itself - the Income Tax taxes income. '6 Of course, the complexity
of the term 'income' itself has been subjected to a thotough examination
by the Indian courts, and the term has been understood as being used
in contradistinction to the term 'capital' - therefore, income consists of
those receipts that cannot be considered as capital. l7 The courts have also
considered the term 'income' in discussing the distinction between 'real'
and 'fictional' income" and the concept of accrual of income."
The traditional understanding of the term "income" has been that income is a
receipt. Unless something is received, (or, in the case of accrued income, becomes
due for receipt), it cannot form a part of 'income.' To be more precise,
unless one has a legal right to receive (or has in fact received) something, the
question of whether it forms part of one's income does not arise.'o

15

For a detailed discussion on (he mainstreaming of feminist jurisprudence, see C.

Mackinnon, Feminism in Legal Education 1 LEGAL Eouc. REv. 85 (I989).
16

It must be remembered that in economic terms, direct taxes such as income and property
taxes are meant to tax the total production in the economy, as measured by the aggregate
of the fruits of all the work in the economy. See N.C. Staudt, Taxing Housework 84 GEO.

17

The Supreme Court has debated on the meaning of the term 'income' in a number of
cases, including the locus classicus CIT Bengal v. Shaw Wallace & Co., 6 ITC 178

L.]. 1571 (1996).

(1932) PC, which laid down that the meaning of the term was

to

be gleaned by an

examination of the various heads of income enumerated in the Act and enunciated the
principle that income is a 'periodical monetary return',

18

See State Bank ofTravancore v. CIT (1986) 158 ITR 102 (SC) for an absorbing discussion
of the nature of interest on sticky advances.

19
20

See for instance Morvi Industries Ltd. v. CIT AIR 1971 SC 2396 and CIT v. Shoorji
Vallabhdas (1962) 46 ITR 144 (SC).
A perusal of the definition of 'income' in S. 2 (24) of the INCOME TAX Act
reinforces this understanding - all the instances of 'income' enumerated in that
inclusive definition pertain to 'sums'. 'profits', 'gains', and 'values' that have been 'received'
or have accrued to the assessee.
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This, of course, leads us ro the question of whether productive work that does
not lead ro the acquisition of legal rights ro receive payment can be
taxed. In any society, there is some work done and some processes of production
which take place without the flow of a legal consideration or the return of a
legal tight of any kind. While a part of this is production that an individual
undertakes for self-consumption, a latge parr of it is production that just does
not sutface in the market. Household wotk is a ptime exa pie of this kind of
work. While some part of wotk undertaken in a household may be for selfconsumption, most of this work results in benefits for the entite household .
This work is usually not quantified or remunerated, and sometimes dismissed
as reproductive tather than productive labour. 21 However, when this work is
performed in the market, it is in fact remunetated . An example of this is the
care industry. While care which is provided in the market results in an income
for the care-provider, as in the case of tetirement homes and creches, care labour
that is provided outside the market12 or within a household does not tesult in
an income. 23 Therefore, the understanding of 'income' as a receipt or a
legal right ro receive something results in the same activity being treated
differently for the purposes of taxation, based on whether it is performed
within the formal market or outside it.
In 1981, in the case of Bhagwandass Jain v. Union of India, 24 the Supreme
Court held that the expression "income" was of the widest amplitude and that
it included not merely what was received or what came in by exploiting the use
of the property, but also that which could be converted into income. However,

21

For a detailed analysis. see Staudt in Supra notc 16

22

Which is generally provided by women in their social roles as homemakers, mothers etc.
While it is not contended that non market care is provided exclusively by women (after
all , men do provide care too!), it must be acknowledged mat social roles result in nonmarket care being provided largely by women.

23

This examp le of [he care industry can be extended to almost every industry - when
water is supplied by water tankers, it is market recognised economic activity; w hen fetched
from the river, canal or well by women , it is not; when food is o)oked and served in a
restaurant, it results in an 'income' being generatcd; whcn the same activity takes place
within the home , it does not.

24

[1981 J 128 ITR31S

(sq.
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this conclusion was arrived at not in the context of the difference between
market and non-market work, but in the context of ascribing a notional value
to property. The case involved a challenge to Section 23(2) of the Income Tax
Act, which provided for valuation of self-occupied house property as part
of an assessee's income. The Sectio n was upheld by the Supreme Court on
the ground that what was sought ro be taxed was the potential to earn income,
which it was within Parliament's competence to tax.
Thus, the concept of potential or notional income was upheld by the Supreme
Court, and is not a stranger to Indian tax law; however, it has never been applied
to bring to tax non-market wo rk or household labour. This obviously results
in a compromise of the principle of neutrality of taxation. The productive
value of non-market labour is thus tax-free. As a result, all other factors being
equal, where socially prescribed gender roles allow a choice between market and
non-market labour, i.e., for women, non-market labour is an economically
attractive option. This violation of tax neutrality is often defended on the flimsy
ground that non-market labour is impossible to value;" as we have seen, the
law is no stranger to the taxation of notional income, which is just one of the
myriad solutions that have been proposed to the problem of valuation.
This compromise of neutrality between work done within and outside
the formal market, when added ro the fact that social roles designate most
work outside of the formal market to be 'women's work,' points to serio us
lacunae in the equity of the tax sys tem, which appears to be reinforcing and
reproducing the inequities in society, rather than remedying them.

THE UNIT OF TAXATION - WHOM DOES THE INCOME TAX TAX?
The answer to this question seems as self-evident as that to the previous question
- the income tax taxes anyone with an income. The answer, however, is again
25

For a delailed di scussion of the debate o n th e val uation of non marker econo mic act ivity

for the purpo7cs of taxati?n, u~ G. Blumberg, Sn'ism in the Cock: A Comprthtmivt Study of
lncomr Tax4tlon o[Worklng Wzves and Mothcrr 21 BUFF. L. REv. 49 (1971); r.c. Bradford,
Intra-Family Bargaining and Taxing Women 6 S. CAL REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 397
(1997); M. E. Kornhauser, What do Women want: Feminism and the Progressive Income
Tax 96 COLU M. L. REv. 15 1 (1996); also see Supra note 16.

149

National Law School Journal

Vol. 11

2013

not as simple as it seems. In India, as in most other jurisdictions, people can earn
income not only individually, but in groups. Some of these groups are legally
recognised and granted a personality of their own , such as corporations, but
others allowed to transact as groups, but without a legal personali ty - as in rhe
case of partnership firms . The Income Tax Act, therefore, identi fies different
'persons' who may be taxed , including individuals, Hindu Undivided Families
(HUFs) and corporations. 2• The Act does not, however, recogn ise a household
as a taxable entity, except incidentally in the case of some HUFs. This may be
compared with the tax struCtures in the United States and in Australia, both of
which follow a system of joint returns in the administration of taxes."
In such a system, tax returns are not required to be filed by every individual,
but rather jointly by all the members in every family. " Therefore, the unit of
taxation or the assessee is not an individual, but the family or household.
This, when taken in conjunction with the income slabs which determine the
applicable tax rates, results in a situation where the income of the secondary
earner in the household (usually the woman) is taxed at a much higher rate
than the income of the primary earner, resulting in a disincentive for
women to join the paid, market economy, and relegating them to unpaid
labour in the home."
This critique does not, of course, apply directly to the Indian Income Tax Act.
The Indian Income Tax Act uses the family as the unit of personal taxation only
in the case of the Hindu Undivided Family.'· The Hindu Undivided Family
26

S. 2(31) defines a "person" as including an individual, Hindu Undivided fam ily, a company,
a firm, and association of persons or body of individuals. whether incorporated or nQt, a
local authority. and every artificial juridical person not falling within any of the above.

27

For a detailed discussion see M.J . McIntyre, Individual FiHng in the Personal
Income Tax: Prolegomena to Future Discussion 58 N.C.L.Ili-v. 469 (1 980); N . A.
Shurtz, Gender Equity and Tax Policy: The Theory of "Taxing Men " 6 S. CAL.
REv. L. "WOMEN'S STUD. 485 (1997); A. F. Thomas, Marriage and the Income Tax

Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow: A Primer and Legislative Scorecard 16N. Y .L.
SCH

.JL.

HUM .

R"rs. 1 (1999).

28

In the United States, joint filing of tax returns is not mandatory, bue filing joindyemides
a household [0 enjoy lower rates of taxes.

29

Supra note 27.

30

S. 2(31) defines the term 'person' as including a Hindu Undivided Family.
150
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(HUF), which is traditionally understood as consisting of the male 'karta' and
his sons," is a separate unit of taxation, and the income of the HUF is taxed
separately from the income of the individual members of the HUF. Since the
concept of HUF itself varies across the various regions of India," and since
the tax treatment ofHUFs has been a matter much debate, the decisions of
the courts relating ro the tax treatment of HUFs have woven some of
the most tangled knots in the Indian tax system."
The HUF was traditionally understood as consisting of a common male
ancestor and all his male lineal descendants, unmarried daughters, and
wives of the male lineal descendants. However, the coparcenary in the HUF,
i.e., the holding of property, was traditionally limited ro male members of
the H UF. The HUF in Hindu Law consists of any Hindu male with his wife
and children. If such a Hindu male holds ancestral property, it is considered
as coparcenary property. Upon the birth into the family of a member who
can be a second coparcener, the coparcenary itself comes into existence. This
distinction between the coparcenary nature of the properry and the existence of
rhe coparcenary as a unit was recognised in Prem Kumar v. CIT" However, for

31

Aer, 2005 has brought in a measure of gender
the notion of the HUF by giving daughters coparcenary rights on par with

THE HINDU SUCCESSION (AMENDMENT)

equality

[Q

sons. However, [he amendm ent has been criticised for being ill thought out and only a half
measure, partly because it docs nor clarifY whether lhe female members of (he HUF
can be kartm, and what the status of a married daughter is. A recent judgement

of lhe Karnataka High Coun in this respect, therefore, is extremely welcome in clearing
up this fog. See N.V. Push palata v. V. Padma, Case no. RFA 326/2004. judgement da ted
1903.2010.
32

For instance. the form of HUF and the rul es governing it vary according to whether
the HUF is governed by the "Mitakshara" or the "Oayabhaga" school of Hindu Law. A
third type of Hindu undivided family exists in Somh India , particularly in Tamilnadu,
Kerala and Karnataka. In Karnataka, it is known as ''Aliya Samana", and in the Malabar,
it is known as "Marumakkattayam." Sf( Gowli Budana (1966) 60 ITR 293 (SC); N.V.
Narendra Nath (1969) 74 ITR 190 (SC).

33

For instance, see the discussion of HUF income in P.N. Krishna Iyer v. CIT (1969)
73 ITR 539 (SC), and by a fivejudge bench in V.O. Ohanwaty, (1968) 68 ITR 365 (SC);
also consider the discussions in CIT v. Venugopal Irani, (1999) 239 ITR 514 (SC) and
in Roshan Oi Hatti v. CIT, (1986) 68 ITR 177 (SC).

34

121 ITR 347 (All), cf Acharya Shuklendra, Hindu UndividLd Family- Taxation and Tax
Pwnning2000 (REp) 2003, p.17
lSI
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the purposes of taxation. it has been held that as long as coparcenary property
is held by a Hindu male. whether or not there is a second Hindu male. he can
claim to be taxed as a HUF."
The ability to be taxed as a HUF is coveted because it enables an assessee to
divide his income between himself and the HUF. claiming tax exemptions
and deductions twice over in the hands of twO assessees instead of one.
Hindu law also allows a person to merge his property with the ancestral
property. by which it becomes the property of the HUF. Family settlements
may be entered into among members of a HUF. and an HUF can even enter
into contracts with irs karta.36 These ptovisions allow the male members of
HUFs. especially kartas. to minimise their tax burdens without losing control
over their incomes.

Apart from the increase In complexity and the difficulties caused to
the tax administration. the fact that HUFs could only be begun by a male
karta and his male descendants clearly resulted in this system of treating
the HUF as a separate tax entity having gender-inequitable effects.
In 2005. by an amendment to the Hindu Succession Act. women have
been given equal rights in ancestral property by giving daughters the right
of coparcenary. Therefore. Hindu women can now be coparceners in a HUF.
However. since this is an amendment to the Hindu Succession Act. dealing
with succession to ancestral property. and not necessarily overriding other
rules of Hindu Law. it is unlikely that it will be interpreted to mean that
women can now start a HUF. The question of whether they can be kartas
is similarly open. In addition. all the case law that had modified the notion
of a HUF for the purposes of taxation. starting from Gowli B"danna.
refers specifically to male coparceners. and does not make room for the
extension of the right to women. It remains to be seen how this amendment
would impact tax law.

35
36

Gowli Budan. (1966) 60 ITR 293 (SC); N.V. Narendra Nath (J %9) 74 ITR 190 (SC).
Vijay Prakash Toshniwal v. CIT. 284 lTR 306 (Raj)
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On the other hand, the HUF is an entity into which one can enter only by
virtue of status - i.e., as a member of a Hindu family. As a result of the unusual
incorporation of the HUF as a separate taxable entity, Hindus are able
to enjoy a privilege in respect of their taxes that other families are nOt
entitled to. This discrimination on the basis of religion seems to have
gained the status of an unchangeable norm, as even the proposed Direct
Taxes Code does n"o t seek to change the status of the HUF as a taxable entity.
While we are examining taxable entities, it is also pertinent to examine the
provisions of Sections 60 to 65 of the Income Tax Act. These sections
deal with the circumstances in which the income of one person is clubbed
with the income of another. These provisions are clearly designed to combat
tax evasion, and as such, must necessarily be understood in that context. Under
Section 64(1), certain incomes of a person's spouse or his son's wife may
be included in the income of that person. 37 The first point of analysis
is that while clauses (iv) and (vii) of Section 4(1) use the gender-neutral
term 'spouse', clauses (vi) and (viii) apply only to the income of the son's
wife (a daughter-in-law), but not to similar income in the hands of a son-in-law.
Since these provisions were designed as anti-evasion measures, this indicates
an understanding that gratuitous transfers effected to a daughter-in-law
amount to tax-evasive measures, since the individual would continue to have

37

The relevant portions of Section 64(1) read as follows:
"In computing the total income of any individual, there shall be included all such
income as arises d irectly or indirectly

(iv) Subject to the provisions of clause (i) of sectio n 27, to the spouse of such individual from
assets transferred directly or indirectly to the spouse by such individual otherwise than
for adequate conside ration or in connection with an agreement to live apart;
(vi) to the son's wife, of such individual. from assets transferred directly or indirectly on or
after the 1st day of June , 1973, to the son's wife by such individual otherwise [han for
adequate co nsideration;
(vii) to any person or assoc iation of persons from assets transferred directly or indirectly
otherwise than for adequate cons ideration to the person or association of perso ns
by such individual, to the extent to which the income from such assets is for th e
immediat e or deferred benefit of his or her spouse; and
(vii i) to any person or association of persons from assets transferred directly or indirecdy on
or after the 1st day of June, 1973, otherwise [han for adequate cons ideration , to the
person or associat ion of persons by such individual , to the extent to which the income
from such assets is for the immediate or deferred benefit of his son's wife ... "
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control over the income, while sim ilar transfers effected in favou r of a sonin-law would not amount to evasive measures, as the individual would
then lose control over the source of the income."
Apart from this overtly gendered assumption, the section has a gendered effort.
As we have already seen, the Act discards neutrality in its treatment of market
and non- market work, thus skewing the balance against the participation of
women in the formal economic market. In a society where the balance of
social mores and behavioural norms already favours such non-participation,
one source of economic security for women is the transfer to them of a source
of income by their spouses. The Act, however, treats such transfers as tax
evasive measures, and accordingly acts to discourage them . In do ing so, the
Act has the effect of disempowering women economically, by imposing
a tax-disincentive on their acquisition of an income source,39
While it is not necessaty that all gtatuitous transfers be assumed to be innocent,
tax evasion can be dealt witl, by allowing a case-by-case evaluation of whether
evasion has taken place instead of presuming it to be so. T e gendered effect
of the provision should be taken into account and weighed against the
possibility of such transfers being tax-evasive measures, and the inconvenience
of allowi ng a case-by-case determination of whether a particular transfer
constitutes tax evasion or not.

THE SCOPE OF TAX-EXEMPT INCOME
Under the Income Tax Act, income is left untaxed either when it IS
exempted ftom taxation completely or when it is allowed as a deduction In
the computation of total taxable income. In exam ining these exemptions and
deductions, certain general observations as regards the fi scal objectives that
are sought to be served must be kept in mind .

38

Such gendered assumptions are present throughout the Act , and this is merely one overt
instance of them.

39

This is even mOfe ironic if we consider the fact that such transfers are considered
'gratuitous' only because the services in recognition of which they are made are nonmarket services which do nO[ generate an 'income.'
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As they stand today, the system of exemptions and deductions weave a
complicated web, none of the strands of which can be followed in such a
manner as to definitely ascertain their policy objectives. However, the general
understanding has been that exemptions from income taxation are used
as incentives for the encouragement of certain kinds of economic behaviour.
For instance, income that is saved or invested rather than consumed is generally
subjected to preferential treatment in tax terms'O
Further, investment in government bonds and other kinds of public
debt is encouraged." Similarly, investment in social security schemes such as
a Provident Fund or gratuity scheme is encouraged by allowing deductions
of the amount so saved ftom taxable income'2 We will now examine some
of these exemptions and deductions and tty to understand their objectives and
possible effects.

TREATMENT OF 'SOCIAL SECURITY'
In one sense, the ptovisions of the Income Tax Act behave as a complement to
the slew of labour laws in India. The Provident Fund Act, for instance,
makes it compulsory for certain employers to make contributions to the
provident fund, while leaving it optional for certain other employers. The
Income Tax Act provides for the recognition of these 'optional' funds, so
that employers and employees who make such contributions are entitled
to the same tax benefits as those who make mandatory contributions" This
is intended to encourage savings through regulated Ptovident Fund and
Pension Schemes, even where such savings are not mandatory. This has the
added effect of accumulating savings so as to allow investments to be made
by these funds.
40

S. 80C. for instance, provides [hat income up to one lakh rupees invested in
certain specified investmems such as life insurance will be deductible from to[al incom e
in computing dIe total taxable income.
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s.
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S. II, l2and 13 of theiN cOMETAX ACT.

43

Schedule IV of m e INCOME TAX ACT.

1O( 15) provides for the exemption of income received by way of interest on specifi ed
forms of Government borrowings.
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However, this policy of encouraging socially beneficial savings does not
apply uniformly across all the benefits available under the labour laws .
For instance, maternity benefits payable under the Maternity Benefit Act are
treated as part of the income of the recipient, and no special treatment
is accorded to these payments, either in the hands of the employer or in
the hands of the employee. If the Maternity Benefit Act is seen as merely
ensuring that pregnant women are entitled to paid leave, this does not
appear problematic - the payments under it are treated in the same way
as any other paid leave." However, when the Materni ty Benefit Act is
seen as a legislation that ensures that certain amounts by way of economic
security are provided to women for a period of time when they are unable to
participate in market-ptoductive activity, a certain inequity may be brought
to light: after all, pension, PF and gratuity payments also ensure that a
certain economic security is available when the individual is no longer
able to participate in market-productive work, and in order to encourage
this form of 'social security', these payments are given lax benefits.

THE (NO N) RECOGNITION OF CHILD CARE

An area that has received a substantial amount of attention in the United States
but has sadly been neglected in India has been the issue of deductibility
of childcare expenses.'s The United States, among other countries, allows
a deduction of childcare expenses from the income of the household when
computing the taxable income of the household.'6 This dedu ction has
come under scrutiny as being discriminatory and insufficient ," but the
44

The Matcrnicy Benefit Act itself does nor provide a due as to the 'lature of the 'benefit'
under it. The Preamble to the Act merely statcs that it is an Act "to regulate the employment
of women in certain establ ishment for certain period before and after childbirth and to
provide for maternity benefit and ccnain ocher benefits."
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M. L. Heen, wdf'" R_jorm, Child Care Com. and Tax,,: Delivering Increased WorkRelaud
Child Care Benefits to LowIneome Famili" 13 L. YALE & POL'y REv. 173 (1995).
This is provided for in ,he form of the rederal Dependent and Child Care Tax Credit.
Ie was originally introduced as a deduction for work-related care expenses in 1954, and
was modified as a credit in 1976. Su http://gQvernment.cce.com~, (accessed on
05.09.2005).
D. B. Tobin, Invming in 0", Children: A Not So Radical Proposal 73 U. CIN. L. REv.
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basic principle underlying it is that since expenses relating to child care are
necessary expenses to enable parents to work outside the home, they sho uld be
allowed as deductions when comp uting the taxable income of the household.
This, essentially, recognises the economic value of childcare, and, in order to
encourage it, provides a tax incentive in relation to it. The only comparable
provision in the Indian law is the allowance of a rebate in respect of tuition fees
paid for the education of a dependent chil d, under Section 88 of the Income
Tax Act, and the recognition of the economic value of childcare cannot be said
to be a motivation for this provision.
Indian law also allows the ded uction of expenditure incurred "wholly and
exclusively for the purposes of the business or profession" while computing
income from a business or profession . H owever, the same provision excludes
"personal expenses of the assessee." Expenses on services that would otherwise
have been performed within a household, and which are considered as nonproductive labour, are usually disallowed under this exception." Therefore,
expenses of childcare would be considered 'personal' but not expenses of other
personal services, such as driving, which are more easily classified as market
work.

48

457 (2004); M. A. Livingston, w"men, Poverty and the Tax Code: A Tale o/Theory and
Practict 5 J. GENDER RACE & J UST. 327 (2002) .
For example, in CIT v. T.S. Hajee Moosa, [1985J 153 ITR 422 (Mad), the court held that
the fact that the assessee's wife had travelled abroad with him on a business trip because it
was essential for him [0 have an anendant on health gro unds would not make her travel
ex penses deductible in computing his income from the business. The court sa id "It is
nOt diabetes that has made him a good businessman. The state of hea1ch of a person is
nOt in any way related to the business activi ti es carried on by him. A good businessman
may be bad in health and a good and health y person may be no good at all in business.
Therefore, the state of health has no relevance or bearing at all [0 the business activities
carried on by a person. If a businessman, not in good health, desires to secure the help
and assistance of an attendant, then it is purely to satisfy his personal need. Such a need
is nOt very diffe rent from , say, his need for food and clothing, except that th is need is
directed towards the maintenance of his health. The expenses incurred for availing of the
services of an anendanr would, in our view, be only (Q satisfy or meet the personal need,
and in that context, it is really immaterial whethe r the person concerned avails himself
of the services of his wife or that of a stranger."
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WHERE ARE WE HEADED
In addition to these, it may be interesting to examine the 'fi·inge benefits tax'"
as representative of the roads which our fiscal policy is seekin g to explore. There
has been a large amount of criticism, both justified and otherwise, of
this tax.'o Apart fro m the debates on whether this is a tax on income or on
expenditure, and whether it can be constitutionally justified,5I there has
been criticism of the categories that have been brought undet the term
'fringe benefit.' 52 In general, the term 'fringe benefit' is understood to apply
to benefits provided by an employer to his employees, which cannot be taxed
in the hands of the individual employee, as they cannot be attributed to a
specific employee but are provided to all the employees in common.53
Even with this understanding of fringe benefits, countric; such as Australia
have face d a situation where the fringe benefits tax act; as a dis incentive
to employers to provide some services (such as on-premises childcare)
which encourage women to join the formal workforce.'" It would be well
for lawmakers in India to keep this in mind as a potential gendered outcome
of the tax.
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Most tax scholarship concentrates on economiC, technical, or practical
issues of tax . Even articles involvi ng political issues tcnd to Stress the
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See Chapter XI I H of the INCOME TAX ACT.
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K. R. Srivats, India Inc wan" FBT Defimd THE HINDU BUSINESS LINE, March 17,2005;
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government and society. This paper attempts to use certain non-traditional
views and rheories to examine provisions , some of which were enacted
in far different times by people with world views not representative
of all taxpayers back then (let alone now). Feminist legal theory, by its
very nature, explores provisions rhat have adverse sexist or racist effects,
but these effects can be adverse without being hostile in a personal sense.
Sexism and racism can be unintentional; they can be institutional rarher
than individual, and rhe effect may be adverse at one point in time rather
than anorher. Similarly, though feminist tax theory is unsettling because it
shows a heretofore hidden trurh or problem, it is nor hosti le to traditional
rheories of tax.
Thus, while rhis paper does not profess to address all rhe aspects of sexism
in tax law, or to identify all the ptovisions that have gendered assumptions
ot effects, it does seek to bring to light sexism in rhe supposedly genderneutral area of taxation. The above analysis, thus, draws attentio n to a
feminist critique of the Indian fiscal structure, and seeks to explode the
myth rhat tax law is neutral ro considerations of gender in its ass ump tions
or
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